) and some new algorithms using the software wxMaxima 11.04.0, in order to reach a total scenario knowledge (that is the total knowledge of the payoff space of the interaction) of the classic Cournot Duopoly (1838), viewed as a complex interaction between two competitive subjects, in a particularly interesting asymmetric case. The software wxMaxima is an interface for the computer algebra system Maxima. Maxima is a system for the manipulation of symbolic and numerical expressions, including differentiation, sets, vectors and matrices.
Introduction
The Cournot Duopoly is a classic oligopolistic market in which there are two enterprises producing the same commodity and selling it in the same market. In this classic model, in a competitive background, the two enterprises employ as possible strategies the quantities of the commodity produced. The main solutions proposed in literature for this kind of duopoly are the Nash equilibrium and the Collusive Optimum, without any subsequent critical exam about these two kinds of solutions. The absence of any critical quantitative analysis is due to the relevant lack of knowledge regarding the set of all possible outcomes of this strategic interaction. On the contrary, by considering the Cournot Duopoly as a differentiable game (normal form games with differentiable payoff functions) and studying it by the topological methodologies introduced in Game Theory by D. Carfì, we obtain an exhaustive and complete vision of the entire payoff space of the Cournot game (this also in asymmetric cases with the help of wxMaxima) and this total view allows us to analyze critically the classic solutions and to find other ways of action to select Pareto strategies, in the asymmetric cases too. In order to illustrate the applications of this topological methodologies to the considered infinite game, several compromise decisions are considered, and we show how the complete study gives a real extremely extended comprehension of the classic model.
Formal description of a generalized Cournot normal form game
Our model of Cournot game is a non-linear two-players loss game G = (f, >) (see also [6] , [8] and [9] ). The two players/enterprises are called Emil and Frances (following J.P. Aubin's books [1] and [2] ).
Assumption 1 (strategy sets).
The two players produce and offer the same commodity in the quantities x ∊ ℝ≥ for Emil and y ∊ ℝ≥ for Frances. In more precise terms: the payoff function f of the game G is defined on a subset of the positive cone of the Cartesian plane ℝ 2 , interpreted as a space of biquantities. We assume (by simplicity) that the set of all strategies, of each player, is the interval E = [0, +∞[.
Assumption 2 (asymmetry of the game).
The game G is not assumed necessarily symmetric with respect to the players. In other terms, the payoff pair f(x, y) is not assumed to be the symmetric of the pair f(y, x).
Assumption 3 (form of price function).
We suppose the price function, p from ℝ 2 into ℝ, linear and defined by
for every productive bi-strategy (x, y), where a ≥ 0 is a fixed price and bi > 0 (i = 1,2) is the marginal coefficient corresponding to the production of the player i.
Assumption 4 (form of cost functions).
Let the cost function C1 (defined on E 2 ) of the first player be given by
for every positive price pair (x, y) and let, analogously, the demand function of the second enterprise be given by 
for every positive bi-strategy (x, y). Symmetrically, for Frances, the profit function is defined by
for every positive bistrategy (x, y).
Study of the Cournot's normal form game
In the following we shall study the following particular case. We shall put:
so that, the bi-loss function is defined by
for every bistrategy (x, y) of the game in the unbounded square E 2 .
Payoff function to examine. When the fixed cost d is zero (this assumption determines only a "reversible" translation of the loss space), the bi-loss function ƒ from the compact square [0, 1] 2 into the biloss plane ℝ 2 is defined by
for every bistrategy (x, y) in the square S = [0, 1] 2 which is the convex envelope of its vertices, denoted by A, B, C, D starting from the origin and going anticlockwise. Now, we must find the critical space of the game and its image by the function ƒ, before representing ƒ(S).
For, we determine (as explained in [3] , [6] , [8] and [9] ) firstly the Jacobian matrix of the function ƒ at any point (x, y) -denoted by Jƒ(x, y). We will have, in vector form, the pair of gradients Jƒ(x, y) = ((y + 4x -1, x), (y, 2y + x -1)), (3. 2) and concerning the determinant of the above pair of vectors det Jƒ(x, y) = (y + 4x -1)(2y + x -1) -xy = = 2y 2 + 8xy -3y + 4x 2 -5x + 1.
The Jacobian determinant is zero at those points (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) of the strategy square such that this abscissa is so µ1 = 2 /8 (equal to 0,25).
We start from Figure 3 .1.
The transformations of the bi-strategy square vertices and of the points H, K are the following:
Starting from Both Emil and Frances do not control the Pareto minimal boundary; they could reach the point K' and H' of the boundary, but the solution is not many satisfactory for them. In fact, a player will suffer the maximum loss. Remark. Comparing the figure 5.1 with the figure 5.2 we may observe that the benefit to the community in case of asymmetry decreases; in fact the area contained in the first quadrant is greater than the symmetric case and the area contained in the third quadrant is smaller than the symmetric one. In other terms, when the Cournot duopoly becomes an asymmetric games is easier to have a loss.
Properly non-cooperative (egoistic) phase
Now, we will consider the best reply correspondences between the two players Emil and Frances.
If Frances produces the quantity y of the commodity, Emil, in order to reply rationally, should minimize his partial cost function According to the Weierstrass theorem, there is at least one Emil's strategy minimizing that partial cost function and, by Fermàt theorem, the Emil's best reply strategy to Frances' strategy y is the only quantity B1(y) = x* := 1 /4(1 -y).
( 6. 2) Indeed, the partial derivative The Nash equilibrium is the fixed point of the multifunction B -associated with the pair of two reaction functions (B2, B1) -defined from the Cartesian product of the domains into the Cartesian product of the codomains (in inverse order), by B : (x, y) ↦ (B1(y), B2(x)), that is the only bi-strategy (x, y) such that its minimum will be
2) attained at the conservative strategy x # = 0.
Frances' worst loss function is defined by
3) its minimum will be
attained at the unique conservative strategy y # = 0.
Conservative bivalue. The conservative bivalue is
The worst offensive multifunctions are determined by the study of the worst loss functions.
The Frances' worst offensive reaction multifunction !2 is defined by !2(x) = 1, for every Emil's strategy x; indeed, fixed an Emil's strategy x the Frances' strategy 1 maximizes the partial cost function ƒ1(x, .). The Emil's worst offensive correspondence versus Frances is defined by !1(y) = 1, for every Frances' strategy y.
The dominant offensive strategy is 1 for both players, indeed the offensive correspondences are constant.
The core of the payoff space (in the sense introduced by J.P. Aubin) is the Pareto minimal boundary, contained in the cone of lower bounds of the conservative bi-value v # ; the conservative bi-value don't give us a bound for the choice of cooperative bistrategies.
The conservative knot of the game is the point (0, 0).
Cooperative phase
When there is an agreement between the two players, the best compromise solution (in the sense introduced by J.P. Aubin) showed graphically in the Figures 8.1 .
Besides, the best compromise solution coincides with the core best compromise, with the Nash bargaining solution, with the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. It coincides also with the transferable utility solution which is the unique Pareto strategy that minimized the aggregate utility function f1 + f2, this can be easily viewed by geometric evidences considering on the payoff universe the levels of that aggregate function, which are affine lines parallel to the vector (1,-1 ). 
